S1. Replicator Dynamics in Donation Games with Deposit-Based Commitment
We analyze the replicator dynamics in the case of deposit-based commitment to costly peer punishment. Let x S and P S be, respectively, the frequency and expected payoff value for strategy S with S = ALLC (cooperator), ALLD (defector) and COM (faithful committer). The replicator dynamics are described as, , where is the average payoff over the population. Indeed,
From 
in which, for simplicity, we removed a common term for the expected benefit (the replicator dynamics are not affected by such a transformation). Thus,
From Equations (S2) and (S3), it follows that when (that is, on the COM-ALLC edge),
Let R2 be the boundary point on the edge with and . Following the replicator dynamics in Equation (S4), thus, the point R2 divides the edge into the basins of attraction for the COM and ALLC nodes.
Similarly, when (that is, on the COM-ALLD edge),
Let R1 be the boundary point on the edge with and . Following Equation (S6), thus, the point R1 divides the edge into basins of attraction for the COM and ALLD nodes. Then, Equation (2) also yields,
and:
Therefore, solving Equations (S8) and (S9) yields a unique interior equilibrium such that:
The interior equilibrium Q is a saddle point. To check this, we shall show that the Jacobian matrix at Q, J Q , has a negative determinant,
. 
In Equation (S11),
where:
From Equation (10), at (S14)
S3
and thus,
Whatever the value of the lower diagonal component, therefore, we obtain that .
S2. Replicator Dynamics for ALLC, ALLD, PEER and COM
Competition in peer punishment (PEER) and deposit-based commitment (COM) ( Figure S1 ): We analyze the replicator dynamics for ALLC, ALLD, PEER and COM. Since playing ALLC is clearly better off than playing PEER by saving the punishing fee, whatever others do, all interior orbits in the state space will converge to the boundaries of the state space (see Figure S1A) . Similarly, ALLD dominates ALLC. Dynamics for other pairs of strategies, PEER and ALLD, COM and PEER, COM and ALLC, COM and ALLD, each can be bistable. This leads to separating the state space into three basins of attractions for attractors: COM node, ALLD node and PEER-adjacent segment of the PEER-ALLC edge (a continuum of fixed points). We note that there is no interior fixed point in the three-dimensional replicator system. Restricted to the ALLD-PEER-COM and ALLC-PEER-COM surfaces, yet, interior fixed points (on the surfaces) are possible, because punishment of ALLC, ALLD and PEER by COM can make the payoffs for the three strategies equal one another. Figure S1 . Competition of peer punishment (PEER) and deposit-based commitment (COM). (A) Interior trajectories are attracted either to a homogeneous state of COM (COM-node) or a homogeneous state of ALLD (ALLD node), a mixed state of PEER and ALLC (segment of the PEER-ALLC edge, adjacent to the PEER node); (B) colored regions correspond to three different basins of attraction, respectively, for the COM-node (blue, relative size: 40%), ALLD-node (red, 43%) and PEER-ALLC edge (green, 17%), in the parameter specific settings. Parameters are as in Figure 2 .
